ENHANCING WIFI NETWORK SECURITY AGAINST EVIL TWIN ATTACK IN AFIT CAMPUS WITH WIFI PROTECTED ACCESS 3 (WPA3)
Abstract
The widespread adoption of WiFi networks within AFIT campus has revolutionized connectivity, enabling seamless academic and administrative functions. However, this reliance has also introduced significant cybersecurity risks, with Evil Twin attacks emerging as a difficult threat. These attacks exploit users’ trust by creating rogue access points mimicking legitimate networks, leading to unauthorized interception of sensitive data. This research investigates the vulnerabilities of campus WiFi networks to Evil Twin attacks and explores the role of Wi-Fi Protected Access III (WPA3) in mitigating these threats. WPA3, the latest standard in wireless security protocols, introduces advanced features such as Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE), forward secrecy, and enhanced encryption mechanisms. Despite its promise, its implementation in AFIT settings faces challenges, including compatibility issues and limited awareness. The study employs a mixed-method approach, combining technical simulations of Evil Twin attacks in laboratory environments with field assessments of campus WiFi configurations. Questionnaires and interviews were conducted to gather insights from network administrators and users, highlighting behavioral and infrastructural gaps in security practices. Findings reveal that while WPA3 significantly enhances protection against Evil Twin attacks through its robust encryption and authentication capabilities, its adoption is hindered by hardware limitations and administrative constraints. Recommendations include practical strategies for integrating WPA3 into campus networks, enhancing user awareness, and developing security frameworks tailored to academic environments. This research contributes to the growing field of wireless security by addressing the implementation gaps and offering actionable solutions for safeguarding AFIT WiFi networks against sophisticated cyber threats.
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